OPTIMJACK: How One Poisoned Script Turned 178 Trusted Websites Into Card Skimmers — and Why the Attackers Are Already Back

On Monday, November 16, 2026, visiting some of the most trusted websites on the internet could have cost you your credit card number, your crypto, or worse. Hackers slipped malicious code into the websites of 178 organizations — including CNN, the BBC, Zoom, HSBC, IKEA, Salesforce, GitLab, and crypto wallet maker Ledger — by abusing a tool those companies use to test different versions of their web pages. Researchers have named the campaign OPTIMJACK, and the most unsettling part of the story is not how it happened. It is what researchers found this week: the operators are already rebuilding.

A Trusted Tool Becomes a Weapon

Optimizely is a widely used experimentation platform. It lets large companies run A/B tests by loading a single JavaScript file from Optimizely’s content delivery network onto their pages. Each customer can add custom code — called Project JavaScript — that runs on every page of their site.

On November 16, an attacker gained write access to that custom-code field across dozens of unrelated customer accounts and injected a malicious loader into it. Because Optimizely’s CDN served the poisoned files with Optimizely’s own certificate, every visitor to an affected site loaded the malware automatically. Nothing on the sites themselves looked wrong.

Security researcher Scott Helme, founder of the monitoring firm Report URI, found the attack on Monday. His team checked 1,611 Optimizely snippets and found 188 infected files belonging to 178 organizations across 20 sectors, according to SecurityOnline.info. The injection window ran roughly from 04:21 to 21:52 UTC on November 16 — about 17 hours — and researchers counted 32 banking and finance organizations among the victims, according to Memeburn.

Optimizely confirmed the incident on its status page at 01:02 UTC on November 17, stating that an unauthorized party had exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation product to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. The company said it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code, and secured the affected accounts. A spokesperson told Gizmodo the flaw was in the account signup flow, according to StepSecurity.

Four Attacks in One 30-Kilobyte Script

The payload was a single JavaScript file of about 30 kilobytes, and it did four jobs at once, according to SecurityOnline.info and Censys:

  1. It skimmed payment cards. The script hooked form submissions and input fields on every page it loaded, collected anything that looked like a card number, expiry date, or CVV, validated the number with a Luhn check, and sent it to the attacker’s server along with the page URL. It captured card details typed into a website’s own payment forms — hosted payment flows such as Stripe or Adyen iframes were not reached, according to BlueSec Intel.
  2. It swapped crypto wallet addresses. The script replaced any copied cryptocurrency address in a visitor’s clipboard with one of eight hardcoded attacker wallets — one per chain: Ethereum, Bitcoin, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, Tron, TON, Solana, and Dogecoin. A visitor who copied an address to send funds would have pasted the attacker’s address instead.
  3. It stole page data. The script posted the page URL, up to 8,000 characters of cookies, and a screenshot of the page as the visitor’s browser rendered it, captured with a browser-side screenshot library, to the attacker’s server.
  4. It tried to hack iPhones and iPads. On Apple devices, the code loaded two known iOS exploit kits — Coruna and DarkSword — targeting iOS versions 13 through 18.x through a hidden iframe. Desktop visitors got the skimmer, clipper, and data theft instead; the exploit chain never loaded for them, according to Censys.

The Media Trust, which tracked the same campaign as “Hydra-Cart,” warned in a November 17 alert that the threat was still active and put billions of online shoppers at risk as they browsed early Black Friday deals. Its researchers also found a Hootsuite session-cookie stealer in an earlier variant of the code.

The Money Trail — Small Haul, Big Machine

For all its reach, the campaign’s confirmed on-chain theft was modest: roughly $6,600 to $7,040 stolen, according to SecurityOnline.info. Censys traced the wallets in detail. The campaign’s Ethereum wallet received a 0.0192 ETH seed payment on November 12, and 4,310.82 USDC left it by direct transfer on November 16. On Tron, 546.8 USDT moved to a high-volume aggregator address at 13:05 UTC on November 16. Five Bitcoin payments totaling 0.0853 BTC and three Litecoin payments totaling 17.02 LTC arrived the same day. The wallets were swept to the operator’s recurring destination in the early hours of November 17.

The small haul is not the point. The point is the machine behind it. Censys, which sinkholed the campaign’s domains starting November 16 to observe who reached them, published a detailed follow-up this week linking the operation to a much larger infrastructure: a control panel titled “MCH control platform,” observed on 142 web properties as of November 17; an iOS exploit backend branded “Caishen,” on 144 properties; and cryptocurrency “energy rental” storefronts on 55 properties. The same kit’s channel code, 02111110, appeared in both the loader and the skimmer.

Censys dates the staging back to November 9 — a full week before the theft — when the first payload server appeared. The same loader had already been seen running through other third-party libraries, including Kissmetrics on November 13, StorifyMe, and Minute Media, suggesting Optimizely was the biggest delivery route, not the only one.

Already Back: The Operators Rebuilt Within a Day

Here is the part that should worry every website operator and every shopper heading into Black Friday. The campaign’s staging hosts and implant command-and-control host went offline between 03:30 and 05:22 UTC on November 17, within hours of disclosure. Within about 24 hours, five new MCH panel hosts were live on a Hong Kong network, and the kit vendor had re-listed DarkSword-27.1 packages on GitHub under a new Telegram contact, according to Censys.

Censys assesses with moderate confidence that the campaign operator rented the loader from a vendor rather than building it — the loader domain, webshell.lol, predates the campaign by two years and advertises webshells and black-hat SEO services. The control panel, the exploit backend, and the storefronts are products that many operators run. That means the infrastructure behind OPTIMJACK is not a one-off weapon. It is a shelf product, and its next customer is already shopping.

The Same Week, a Second Supply-Chain Hit

OPTIMJACK was not the week’s only supply-chain compromise. On November 17, two releases of Microsoft’s agent-framework package appeared on PyPI — versions 1.26.1 and 1.26.2 — that were not Microsoft’s work. Both wheels dropped a .pth file into Python’s site-packages, which Python executes at every interpreter start, so the credential stealer ran whenever Python started in an affected environment — no import of the package was needed.

The stealer harvested environment variables that looked like secrets, up to 80 credential files, and secret-looking values from other processes, then minted fresh Azure managed-identity tokens, Azure DevOps federated tokens, and, in 1.26.2, GitHub Actions identity tokens, according to Corgea’s research. Both versions were pulled from PyPI the same day, and version 1.26.0 remains the last clean release.

On November 20, Wiz published the root cause: the attacker “appears to have compromised a client certificate and private key for Microsoft ESRP (Engineering System Release Pipeline),” the internal service Microsoft uses to sign and publish the package. The first publish attempt came from AWS and was rejected by ESRP’s IP filtering; a second attempt from Microsoft-owned IP space went through. Wiz’s analysis of the attacker’s own exfiltration endpoint — a public webhook.site URL whose free tier kept only 100 requests — suggests only three distinct victims had data successfully exfiltrated. As of November 20, Microsoft’s agent-framework, onnxruntime, and onnxruntime-genai repositories still returned 404 from the GitHub API after Microsoft made them private during the investigation, according to Corgea.

Two different supply chains, two different victims, one lesson: attackers no longer need to break into your systems. They can ride in through the tools and packages you already trust.

What To Do Now

For website operators, the checklist is immediate: audit every third-party script your pages load, check whether any of your pages load the identified Optimizely scripts or the campaign’s domains, and review logs back to 04:00 UTC on November 16, according to StepSecurity. If your site uses Optimizely, confirm the injected code is gone and that affected accounts have been secured — and remember that Hudson Rock reports an embedded fallback payload that runs when the delivery host is blocked, so removing the injected project code is the real fix.

For shoppers, the timing is unforgiving: Black Friday is a week away, and a skimmer that lives on a trusted retailer’s own checkout page defeats every “only shop on sites you trust” rule. Check card statements for unfamiliar charges, use virtual card numbers or a payment wallet where possible, and treat any crypto address you paste as guilty until verified — compare the pasted address character by character before sending.

For developers and DevOps teams, pin agent-framework to 1.26.0, search lockfiles, CI logs, and container images for versions 1.26.1 or 1.26.2, and never start a suspect environment’s Python again before inspecting it — starting it runs the stealer again, according to Corgea. If either version was installed, rebuild the environment and rotate every secret it could have seen.

The Bottom Line

OPTIMJACK turned the web’s trust model inside out: 178 of the world’s most recognizable websites served malware to their own visitors for 17 hours, not because any of them were hacked directly, but because a single shared tool was. The confirmed theft was only a few thousand dollars — but the infrastructure behind it, from the MCH control panel to the Caishen iOS exploit backend, was already back online within a day, ready for the next customer. And in the same week, a stolen Microsoft signing credential let an attacker publish a credential stealer as if it were Microsoft itself. The supply chain is the attack surface now. Trust nothing you did not verify — not the script, not the package, and not the publisher.

Sources: Censys, “MCH and Caishen: supply chain poisoning pushes iOS exploits,” November 2026; SecurityOnline.info, “OPTIMJACK Optimizely Malware Hits 178 Major Brands,” November 17, 2026; StepSecurity / ThreatCluster, “OPTIMJACK” incident timeline, updated November 17, 2026; BlueSec Intel, “Daily Cybersecurity Briefing — 2026-11-20”; The Media Trust, “MEDIA ALERT: The Media Trust Warns of Newly Discovered Active Threat to Online Shoppers Ahead of Black Friday,” Business Wire, November 17, 2026; Memeburn, “Optimizely Hack: Is Your Crypto Wallet or iPhone at Risk?”; Corgea, “Microsoft agent-framework 1.26.1 and 1.26.2 on PyPI ran a .pth credential stealer,” updated November 20, 2026.


Edited by Muse @QUE.COM

Website: https://QUE.COM Intelligence

Sponsored by: https://MAJ.COM AI Autonomous

Never miss a customer call again — MAJ.COM’s AI receptionist answers every call, texts customers back instantly, and books the appointment for you. See how it works at https://MAJ.COM


Discover more from QUE.com

Subscribe to get the latest posts sent to your email.

Leave a Reply

Connect with

Discover more from QUE.com

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading